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 Everybody loves small firms.  Whether big donors or small, bilateral or multilateral.  Whether 
left or right, government or non-government, practitioners or academics, myself included.  Small firms 
have even gained a prestigious place in the firmament of social policy, where microcredit and other 
small-firm programs are seen as forming a safety net into which the poor can gently fall.  But this is 
exactly where the trouble begins, and that’s what this article is about. 
Over the last decade or so, myriad programs, projects, and policy reforms have focused 
attention on informal-sector firms (IS) and small firms (SF) in general, as part of a broader social-policy 
agenda of reducing poverty and unemployment.2  Despite this welcome attention, many planners in 
developing countries nevertheless continue to view SF/IS programs as “only” welfare, rather than the 
stuff of “serious” economic development.  The particular form taken by SF/IS support in many countries 
reinforces this view, as explained below, as does the way SF/IS support is often embedded in politics.  
This jeopardises certain benefits, ironically, that we hold crucial to the current agenda of reducing 
poverty and unemployment: greater observance by firms of environmental and labour regulations, 
sustained increases in efficiency and productivity in local economies and, as a result, improvement in the 
quantity and quality of jobs. 
 I was first struck with the darker side of small-firm and informal-sector support when 
interviewing economic-development officials in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco.  I was curious to 
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know why they had not included, in a new program of support to a handful of small-firm clusters in the 
state, a particularly vibrant and longstanding garment cluster about a two-hour drive from the capital 
city.  They explained that it would be quite awkward to elevate to “growth-pole” status a cluster of firms 
that was notorious for not paying taxes and not observing other government regulations.3  At the same 
time, however, they did not see themselves as having the option to enforce these regulations, even as a 
quid pro quo for providing public support, because the cluster was concentrated in two municipalities 
that contained more than 30,000 electors. 
 After visiting some other places and reading about cases in other countries, 
I came to interpret what I was observing as a kind of unspoken deal between politicians and their 
constituents–myriad small-firm owners, many in the informal sector.  If you vote for me, according to 
this exchange, I won’t collect taxes from you; I won’t make you comply with other tax, environmental, 
or labour regulations; and I will keep the police and inspectors from harassing you.  I call this tacit 
understanding “the devil’s deal” because it causes informality to become more attractive, and 
formalisation less attractive, than they otherwise might be.  Once the deal is made, it is difficult for either 
side to get out of it, as the above-mentioned comments of the Brazilian officials reveal.   
 In certain ways, then, the devil’s deal can pose just as significant a barrier to formalisation and 
upgrading of small-firm clusters4 as the actual costs themselves of formalisation and regulation.   Much 
of the policy advice on this subject, however, focuses on the “burdens” themselves as the source of the 
problem–particularly, the costs of formalising and observing tax, environmental, and labour codes.  It 
advocates reforms, in turn, that grant special relief from these burdens to small firms in the form of 
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exemptions from or reductions of taxes and other costs associated with environmental and labour 
regulation.  In addition, the small firm literature is strangely silent on the politics in which support to small 
firms is so firmly embedded.5 
 The dynamic of the devil’s deal also reinforces the distinctly dismissive attitudes held by many 
development planners and by development-bank managers toward smaller and informal-sector (IS) 
firms.  To the extent that these managers and civil servants acknowledge the importance of SF/IS 
assistance, they often view it as a “welfare” measure that belongs in “social” rather than economic 
development agencies – in ministries or departments of labour or social welfare, or special small-firm 
agencies.  In their eyes, support to small firms will help mop up the unemployment resulting from the 
necessary reforms and initiatives meant to restructure the economy and institutions of government for a 
world of liberalised trade.   
 In these terms, the small firm sector becomes mainly an instrument for preserving and even 
creating jobs – albeit often poor-quality jobs in poor quality firms – rather than as an opportunity to 
stimulate economic development.  This frees policymakers to dedicate their economic-development 
attention elsewhere, by reducing for them the political cost of the job losses that ensue from the 
modernisation of industry and economic-policy reforms.  From this perspective, and more generally, 
small firm assistance programs do the important work of helping to maintain the “social peace,” rather 
than helping to modernise the local economy.6  Contributing to this same perspective, many international 
donors and non-government organisations couch their current support for IS/SF assistance, such as 
micro-credit and other programs, in terms of “safety-net” measures for poverty reduction. 
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 The “devil’s deal” offers more to IS/SF clusters than just disregard of their violation of 
regulations.  Governments often grant small firms a particular kind of support in which there is something 
for everyone – special lines of cheap credit, blanket credit amnesties when times are bad, and blanket 
exemptions for small firms from certain taxes and regulations.  The exemptions are “burden-relieving” in 
that they reduce the small firms’ costs (or keep them from increasing) in a way that requires no effort on 
their part.  They are also “universalist” or “distributive” in that they benefit all small firms–whether they 
want to grow or not, whether they are seeking to improve their efficiency or not, and regardless of 
sector. 
 In maximising the number of satisfied constituents, this kind of support to small firms is ideal for 
maintaining and increasing electoral loyalty.  It is less than ideal, however, for stimulating local economic 
development that is sustained and employment-enhancing.  Today, that is, the most widely agreed-upon 
forms of effective public support for local economic development do not have this universalist and 
burden-relieving character.  In some ways, in fact, they are just the opposite.  They strategically identify 
and try to remove bottlenecks to improved efficiency, productivity, and marketing for the sector as a 
whole.  Before any significant support is rendered, they often require or elicit broad involvement of the 
sector in a process of discovering exactly what the problem is and what to do about it.  And they may 
benefit directly – at least at first – only those firms most capable and most interested in upgrading their 
production, which, in turn, often leads to their formalisation.  The histories of dynamic small-firm clusters 
often reveal this particular kind of strategic public support which, in turn, has been central to the 
formation of strong local economies and the reduction of unemployment. 
 Once the “devil’s deal” has been made between firms and politicians, it becomes politically 
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awkward for governments to carry out the above-mentioned strategic and sector-specific support 
because it does not automatically benefit all small firms.  To the extent that it does benefit the region as a 
whole – as in the breaking of important infrastructure bottlenecks or the linking of local producers to 
outside buyers through trade fairs – the benefits may be longer in coming and more diffuse, and their 
effects may be felt by many firms only indirectly.  These traits are just the opposite of those 
characterising the relief provided by the burden-reducing exemptions and subsidies – immediate, 
automatic, universal, conspicuous, and directly available to each firm as an individual unit. 
 Classifying firms by their size (small, medium, or large) for purposes of public policy, rather than 
by their product or sector, reinforces the tendencies toward the burden-reducing approach.  “Small,” 
that is, can encompass a quite diverse set of firms – rustic and sophisticated, producing in different 
sectors, and located in different places.  For purposes of lobbying for burden-reducing measures, for 
example, “small” can even be include both a rustic brick-making operation in the countryside and a 
sophisticated software firm in the city.  With such heterogeneity, the only way an association can serve a 
majority of its members is to appeal to the broadest common denominator – namely, size.  But the kind 
of support that best fits the size denominator is the burden-reducing subsidies and exemptions because 
of, as seen above, their universal and distributive benefits.  That is why we often find small-firm 
associations pressing more for the universalist exemptions than for the strategic supports.  In this sense, 
then, size is also the lowest common denominator, in that its associated subsidies and exemptions are 
the least likely to lead to sustained development. 
 No one would deny the importance of small-firm associationalism in the histories of many 
dynamic industrial clusters.  Organising and lobbying according to firm size, moreover, may be the only 
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way small firms can hope to compete with larger and more powerful firms for the attention of 
policymakers.  At the same time, the attention paid by governments and donors to firms according to 
their (small) size – and to small-firm associationalism – can also work inadvertently in the same direction 
as the devil’s deal.  
 The large volume of research on small firms and their clusters does not tell us much about the 
circumstances under which universalist concerns and demands will dominate strategic ones in small-firm 
associations, let alone the sequence by which universalist concerns and their burden-relieving support 
sometimes miraculously give way to more strategic episodes.  Complicating the story, the two 
approaches may coexist within the same association.7  Putting together and lobbying for a strategic 
agenda, moreover, requires harder work over a longer period of time – more deliberation, analysis, and 
consensus – than lobbying for the burden-reducing exemptions and subsidies.  In this sense, the 
universalist exemptions of the devil’s deal will be more appealing to small-firm associations because they 
are easier, just as they are more appealing to politicians because of their greater political yield. 
 Focusing on the difficulties small and informal firms face in meeting the costs of environmental 
and labour standards distracts our attention from pursuing opportunities for firms to, indeed, rise to the 
occasion and meet these standards, rather than be exempt from them.  Though we are used to thinking 
that small firms need protection from these “excessively” burdensome costs, there are many cases in 
which they have actually met those costs and, contrary to the burden-relieving scenario, have been 
better off for it.  They became more efficient, produced higher quality goods, and gained new access to 
more demanding markets.   
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 How did such dynamic clusters get from where they were before – when they were the pathetic, 
low-productivity small firms of the welfare scenario – to where they are today?  Much of the research 
on small-firm clusters fails to ask this particular question, dedicated as the research has been to 
understanding how these clusters function at any particular moment in time or drawing best-practice 
lessons for practitioners.  It is the evolutionary sequence of these cluster histories, however, that will 
reveal lessons on how to promote small-firm dynamism while not compromising – in contrast to the 
burden-reducing approach – our concerns for increasing the rule of law, reducing environmental 
problems, protecting worker rights, and upskilling labour.  The histories will also provide insights into the 
sequences of events and other circumstances under which local actors make the transition from burden-
relieving to more strategic and transformative deeds. 
 Offhand, five recent cases come to my mind of major advances in improving the efficiency, 
productivity, and other sector-wide aspects of partly small-firm clusters in which standards were 
increased rather than waived.  In three of these cases, the advances were triggered in part by suddenly-
imposed bans of importing countries on a developing country’s export.  Germany banned the import of 
leather goods produced with certain chemicals, all used by the Tamil Nadu leather-goods cluster in 
India; the U.S. banned the import of precision surgical instruments from Pakistan, made in the Sialkhot 
cluster, because of problems with the quality of steel; and El Salvador banned the import of Nicaraguan 
cheese because it did not meet the importing country’s new hygienic standards.8  In each of these cases, 
the importing country had been a major buyer of the product for some time.  The producers, acting 
through previously existing collective, public, and public-private institutions, rose to the occasion – 
meeting the costs of the new standards, resuming exporting, and becoming more competitive.  One 
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would not want to count on such wrenching import bans, of course, as a “best practice” for upgrading 
small-firm clusters.   
 The remaining two examples did not need the import bans by customer countries to fuel them, 
and hence show another possible path to similar results.  These two cases were also triggered by 
problems in the international market – namely, increasing competition to small-firm clusters caused by 
the entry of cheaper or better products into the international market from other countries.  One case 
involved a footwear cluster in southern Brazil and the other, a marble cluster in Andalucian Spain.9   
 In both these cases, importantly, the small-firm associations first lobbied government for the 
typical burden-reducing measures – tax exemptions, credit amnesties and subsidies.  But, unusually, the 
government explicitly rejected the burden-reducing approach as a way of coping with the crisis 
provoked by the outside competition.  Making its own counter-demand, the government agency 
involved offered a different kind of deal in exchange for support: it required that the firms gather 
together and engage in a time-consuming and difficult exercise that identified problems and proposed 
sector-specific solutions. 
 In the Andalucian case, the marble cluster had declined through the years partly because of 
increasing competition in the international market from the Italian marble industry.  The Planning Ministry 
offered the following deal: the firms would themselves have to get together, decide what the problems 
were and how they might be overcome, and then arrive at a proposal on what to do.  In addition, the 
Ministry required 100% consensus among the sector’s firms, in return for which it offered technical and 
facilitating assistance for this process, and the promise of financing for whatever proposal for upgrading 
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that might emerge.  This was a deal also, then, but in certain ways it was just the opposite of the devil’s 
deal: what it demanded in return was not political loyalty, but a set of behaviours that would lead to 
greater economic dynamism. 
 In the Brazilian case, similarly, the association of footwear producers – faced with a crushing 
increase in cheap footwear imports in the late 1990s – lobbied the state government of Rio Grande do 
Sul for tax relief.  The government denied the burden-reducing relief, but proposed a different kind of 
exchange.  It offered to finance and assist in other ways the participation of these firms in an important 
major trade fair, an annual event held in the shoe-producing Franca region of Brazil, so as to increase 
their exposure to the large Brazilian market.  As a result, their sales increased significantly, which also 
increased the state’s sales-tax return by more than the amount expended for this support.   
 The Brazilian story also shows that such strategic deals can yield political returns as robust as 
those of the burden-reducing measures.  The state’s footwear cluster, located a few hours from the 
capital city in the Sinos Valley, had typically voted against the party that was in power at the time of this 
offer – the left-wing Workers’ Party.  Many of the smaller firms who benefited from the trade-fair 
experience, however, subsequently shifted their allegiance to that party, in a first-time split of the political 
loyalties of the footwear-producing sector as a whole. 
 Obviously, not all small-firm clusters would be able to respond as successfully as happened in 
these cases.  But the general sympathy in the SF/IS agenda for protecting small firms as a group from 
various burdens – often in the name of protecting the “only” source of employment in particular local 
economies – distracts our attention from possibilities among such firms to meet these costs in a way that 
leaves them and the local economy better off.  Such an economically robust outcome might provide 
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more sustained employment, let alone better environmental and labour standards and tax collection, than 
would protecting small firms as a category. 
 I am arguing, then, that the widespread sympathy for small firms as a special category – and in 
particular their “inability” to pay taxes and conform to environmental and labour standards – tends to 
undermine other important concerns about appropriate strategies for reducing poverty, increasing 
employment and development, and improving governance.  These include reducing environmental 
degradation (to which small-firm clusters can be major contributors); protecting worker rights to 
organise, and improving health and safety in the workplace; expanding the coverage of social security, 
health, and other social insurance to poorer workers; increasing the tax yield of governments so as to 
better finance public services and, in so doing, drawing government and firms together in a contract – in 
this case, to promote a more inclusive style of economic development.  
 Researchers and funding institutions could contribute to breaking the stranglehold of the devil’s 
deal by exploring the paths by which SF/IS firms or sectors actually grew into formality, treated 
workers better and upgraded their skills, and worked toward improving their environmental practices.  
These kinds of cases – where firm agglomerations succeeded in meeting regulatory requirements, 
became more competitive, and were better off for it – need to be sought out and chronicled, such that 
lessons for policy can be learned from them.  This would help to show policymakers – particularly at the 
subnational level, where such enforcement and economic-development support increasingly takes place 
– another path and another set of possibilities.  Showing that such outcomes are perfectly imaginable, 
and familiarising planners with the felicitous outcomes of actual cases and the paths that led to them, 
might also contribute toward reducing the generalised antipathy in the economic-development sector of 
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many countries toward the enactment or enforcement of environmental and labour standards.   
 The policy sympathy for small firms as a category of assistance, in sum, is desirable on many 
grounds.  At the same time, the concern about protecting small firms from reasonable regulations – let 
alone from the vicissitudes of the market – can become toxic when combined with the political dynamics 
of the devil’s deal.  The waiving of tax, labour, and environmental regulations that results from sympathy 
for the “plight” of small firms may hinder rather than help local economies if it condemns them to low-
level economic stagnation, degradation of the environment, and violation of worker rights.  The latter all 
clearly increase unemployment and poverty, as well as burdening unnecessarily the task of poverty-
reducing social policy. 
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      Endnotes 
                                                
1. This note was developed from Section 3 of my chapter, “Why social policy is condemned to a 
residual category of safety nets, and what to do about it: thoughts on a research agenda for UNRISD,” 
in the forthcoming volume, Social Policy in a Development Context,  edited by Thandika 
Mkandawire (copies of the chapter can be obtained from tendler@mit.edu).  I thank UNRISD for 
supporting the larger paper, and for helpful comments on an earlier draft at a seminar on the topic of 
social policy that it sponsored in Sweden.   For comments on this or previous drafts, I thank Mansueto 
Almeida, Éverton Chaves Correia, Alberto Criscuolo, Jacob Lima, Nichola Lowe, Mick Moore, Lisa 
Peattie, Lant Pritchett, Rémy Prud’homme, and Hubert Schmitz, as well as participants in seminars 
sponsored by the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex, Cornell University, Duke University, the 
Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, the World Bank, and the Brazilian Center of 
Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP) in São Paulo.   Support for part of the research contributing to this 
article is gratefully acknowledged from the Brazilian Bank of the Northeast (BN), through the MIT/BN 
project. 
2. By specifying the subject to be firms that are small and/or informal, I am not excluding from the 
universe of firms discussed herein some small firms that are partly or fully formal, and even some firms 
that are producing in the same sector and in the same locality as the small firms, but tending toward 
medium size.  Though this fuzzy definition ignores important distinctions, it is necessary to reflect the fact 
that SF demands often emerge from a set of firms defined by the space they occupy together and the 
same product or value-chain in which they produce.  Just as important, the loose definition serves the 
purpose of brevity, and is also consistent with the language used by the international development 
community in describing and justifying the kinds of policy objectives and programs discussed in this 
article. 
3. The non-payment of taxes in this region has been no secret in Brazil.  A national news magazine 
reported — in an article on the dynamism of the cluster entitled, “Taxes not paid here” – that “this 
  13 
                                                                                                                                                        
[cluster] wouldn’t even exist if firm owners had to pay taxes.”  The chief of the state’s Treasury 
Department, in turn, said that the taxes collected there did “not even represent 1% of what could be 
collected.”  “Aqui não se paga imposto: conheça Santa Cruz do Capibaribe, a cidade que se 
transformou numa das mecas da informalidade no brasil [Taxes not paid here: welcome to Santa Cruz 
do Capibaribe, the city that transformed itself into one of the meccas of informality in Brazil],” José 
Maria Furtado, Revista Exame [Brazil], Vol 35, Edition 733, No. 3, pp. 96-99, 7 February 2001. 
[Translations from the Portuguese are mine.]   
4. With apologies to today’s cluster specialists, I will use the word “cluster” throughout more loosely 
than it is sometimes defined, partly for lack of a better single word and to avoid the more ponderous 
“agglomeration.”  In its more carefully-defined form, a small-firm “cluster” usually means a set of small 
firms located close together geographically with significant inter-firm relations among them, with an at-
least evolving associational dynamic, and usually some history of success in growing, and in improving 
efficiency and productivity; in more recent definitions, other parts of the supply chain to which those 
firms belong also have to be present to qualify as a “cluster.”  My less demanding use of the term 
requires only that a particular region has a significant number of small firms producing the same product 
or in the same value chain, which may also include an admixture of medium and even large firms.  Again, 
my sloppier definition is in some ways more consistent with the way the term is used in the world of 
policy and practice. 
5. There are some exceptions, though they tend to come from outside the small-firm literature, involving 
country studies by political scientists; some take place in the now-industrialised countries.  For example, 
one study that actually narrates an analogous deal between government and informal firms is John 
Cross’ Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). Cross documents how continued informality, in this case, was central 
to the government’s willingness to support the vendors’ organising efforts, and to negotiate a series of 
their demands. In a study of taxation in Zambia, Lise Rakner notes that the government “may have 
refrained from broadening its tax base to include the emerging informal business sector in order not to 
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jeopardise its support among the Owambo-speaking majority; “The Politics of Revenue Mobilisation: 
Explaining Continuity in Namibian Tax Policies,” Forum for Development Studies (No.1, June 2001, 
p. 142). Italian political scientists studying Italy’s postwar period have pointed explicitly to the 
importance of “[c]lientelist generosity – in the form of regulation to protect small business, a lax 
approach to tax collection for the self-employed, and so on – was systematically directed at these 
groups”; see Jonathan Hopkin and Alfio Mastropaolo, “From  patronage to clientelism: comparing the 
Italian and Spanish experiences,” Chapter 7 in Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic 
Representation: the European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, edited by 
Simona Piattoni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  Suzanne Berger’s work on this same 
subject in Italy and France is cited in the following note, #6.  For an interpretation of small-firm politics 
in the U.S. economy as affecting viewpoints and policies, see Charles Brown, James Hamilton, and 
James Medoff, Employers Large and Small (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
6. Using the small-firm sector to maintain employment and the social peace is not unique to the current 
period, or to less-developed countries.  In work on the political economy of industrial policy in France 
and Italy, published more than 20 years ago, the political scientist Suzanne Berger explicitly linked the 
small firm programs and regulations that developed in France and Italy during the 1970s to the 
simultaneous pursuit of a large-firm  industrialisation strategy by those very same governments.  She had 
posed the question of why two countries that had so explicitly pursued a large-firm modernisation 
industrial policy could at the same time have enacted such pro-small firm legislation and assistance.  It is 
from her work that I take the term, “keeping the social peace.”  See,  "The Uses of the Traditional 
Sector in Italy: Why Declining Classes Survive," in: The Petite Bourgeoisie, edited by Frank Bechafer 
and Brian Elliot, pp. 71-89 (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1981); and “The Traditional Sector in 
France and Italy,” in: Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies, edited by Suzanne Berger 
and Michael Piore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),Chapter 4, pp. 88-131. 
7. I thank Nichola Lowe for pointing out these possibilities to me – on the basis of a case from Jalisco 
state in Mexico; see “Trainers by Design: Small Firm Upgrading and Inter-Firm Learning in Jalisco, 
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Mexico,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2002 (forthcoming).  
8. For the German/Indian case, see Poonam Pillai, “The state and collective action: successful 
adjustment of the Tamil Nadu leather clusters to German environmental standards,” Master’s Thesis, 
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, M.I.T., 2000; for the U.S./Pakistan case, see Khalid 
Nadvi, “Collective Efficiency and Collective Failure: The response of the Sialkot surgical instrument 
cluster to global quality pressures,” World Development (27, no.  9:1605-1626, 1999); and for El 
Salvador, see a forthcoming study by Paola Pérez-Alemán, "Decentralized Production, Organization 
and Institutional Transformations: Large and Small Firm Networks in Chile and Nicaragua," Paper 
presented at the Third Meeting of the Institute for Latin American and Iberian Studies, Columbia 
University, International Working Group on Subnational Economic Governance in Latin America from a 
Comparative International Perspective, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 25-28 August 2000.  Note that, in the 
U.S./Pakistan case, Nadvi reports that there was more cross-cluster success in improving the quality of 
the precision steel than with respect to labour and environmental standards. 
9. For the Andalucian case, see Michael Barzelay (2000), “Managing Local Development: Lessons 
from Spain.” Policy Sciences 24 (3 August):271-290; for the Brazilian case, I thank Luiz Miranda of 
the Economics Department of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul.    
